NOTES
STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN
FEDERAL COURTS: BY WHOM IS THE
STATUTE TOLLED?
Two years ago a personal injury action filed successively in
Kentucky and Virginia federal courts was dismissed in Virginia' after
an earlier dismissal in Kentucky when-through no fault of the

plaintiff-the statutes of limitations in both states were deemed to
have run. Now, ten years and nine court decisions 2 after the cause of
action arose, the case of Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co.3 will
finally proceed to litigation on the merits as the result of a decision by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, on a rehearing of the case, to

reverse itself and to create a new federal rule for tolling state statutes
of limitations in diversity cases.
In 1961 Donald Atkins was seriously injured in Virginia by a
machine manufactured by Schmutz Manufacturing Company, a
Kentucky firm doing business solely in Kentucky. Since Virginia at
the time had no long-arm statute, Atkins' personal injury action was
filed in federal district court in Kentucky shortly before the expiration
of Virginia's two-year limitation for tort actions, 4 but after

Kentucky's one-year limitation had run,5 under the then reasonable
assumption that Virginia's statute applied in such a case.' While
I. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968).
2. Schmutz Mfg. Co. v. Atkins, 402 U.S. 932 (197 1); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d.
527 (4th Cir. 1970); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968); Atkins v.
Schmutz Mfg. Co., 268 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Va. 1967); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 389 U.S.
829 (1967); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1967). The initial dismissal in
the federal district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky was not reported, and the reports
of two proceedings in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals-one a reconsideration of the earlier
dismissal by that court and the other involving a petition for further reconsideration -were
withdrawn before publication.
3. 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied. 402 U.S. 932 (1971).
4. \?A. CODE ANN. §§ 8-24, 8-628.1 (1957).
5. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.140 (1969).
6. Kentucky's borrowing statute, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.320 (1969), which in its
current amended form has been in force since 1942. actually rather plainly indicated Kentucky's
one-year limitation was applicable in Atkins' case. Federal courts, however, insisted on
following the pre-1942 rule, which applied Virginia's two-year statute of limitations, because
Kentucky's highest state court had not had occasion to consider and interpret the borrowing
provision after it was amended in 1942. See. e.g.. Albanese v. Ohio River-Frankfort Cooperage
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discovery and other pre-trial proceedings were in progress the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, for the first
time construed the applicable state statute, holding in Seat v. Eastern
Greyhound Lines, Inc. 7 that Kentucky's one-year statute of
limitations applied in cases arising in foreign jurisdictions granting a
longer limitation period. The state court subsequently dismissed
another case 8 which had been filed in reliance on Kentucky's earlier
rule but was still pending decision when the new rule was announced.'
The federal district court in Kentucky declared itself bound to follow
these decisions of the state's highest court and dismissed Atkins' suit
as time barred.' 0 Atkins' appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
was unsuccessful," and the United States Supreme Court eventually
denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.' Meanwhile, Virginia had
enacted a long-arm statute, 3 and before the Supreme Court's denial
of the petition for certiorari made the appeals court decision final,
Atkins commenced a second action in federal district court in
Virginia. Again the suit was dismissed, this time on the ground that
the Kentucky action had not tolled Virginia's statute of limitations,
which by this time had expired."
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal," but
then granted petition for rehearing en banc solely to consider the issue
of whether either state or federal equitable remedies were available to
plaintiff. The resulting decision, and opinion by Chief Judge
Corp., 125 F. Supp. 333, 335 (W.D. Ky. 1954); Burton v. Miller, 185 F.2d 817, 819 (6th Cir.
1950). In both these cases the federal judges acknowledged that sooner or later a binding state
court interpretation would permit them to apply the obvious meaning of the amended statute.
When Atkins instituted his suit in 1963, however, the application of Virginia's two-year
limitations period by Kentucky federal courts was still relatively certain. Collins v. Clayton &
Lambert Mfg. Co., 299 F.2d 362, 364 (6th Cir. 1962); Koeppe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co.. 250 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1957).
7. 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1965).
8. Wethington v. Griggs. 392 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1965).

9. The Seal case in 1965 represented the first opportunity for the Kentucky high court to
deliver the long-awaited binding construction of the state's borrowing statute. See note 6 supra.
The court in Wethington apparently treated the ruling in Seal as a statement of the law as in

effect since 1942 and dismissed plaintiff's action. Presumably. the subsequent dismissal of
Atkins' suit by the federal district court in Kentucky was similarly grounded.

10. The opinion in this case was not reported, but it is described in the Sixth Circuit's
opinion delivered on appeal. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co.. 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1967).
II. Id.
12. ,Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co.. 389 U.S. 829 (1967).
13. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-81.1 - .5 (Supp. 1970).
14. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co.. 268 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Va. 1967).
15. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co.. 401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968).
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Haynsworth, reversed the dismissal and set forth new "federal law"
designed to standardize federal procedure for tolling state statutes of
limitations in diversity cases. 6 In April, 1971, the Supreme Court
17
denied Schmutz Manufacturing Company's petition for certiorari,
and thus left standing the Court of Appeals' holding that the tolling
effect of the pendency of an identical suit in another federal court is a
matter for federal, and not state determination, even though state
statutes of limitations are applied.'" The Atkins decision is
conspicuous for its manifest fairness in leading the plaintiff out of a
procedural dilemma. The path the court took in order to accomplish
this result, however, strikes new features on the ever-changing face of
the so-called "Erie doctrine," and raises complex issues regarding
judicial rulemaking power.

Atkins

AS A MODIFICATION OF THE

Erie

DOCTRINE

Emergence and Development of the Erie Doctrine
The decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 9 discarded nearly
a century of federal diversity decisions based on the 1842 case of Swift
v. Tyson. 2 The Erie rule itself has undergone considerable
modification since its announcement in 1938.21 When Congress
enacted the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,2 it provided that "the laws
of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes
of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the Unit~d
States, in cases where they apply."' 3 Uncertainty over the phrase
"laws of the several states" was settled in 1842, when the Supreme
Court held in Swift v. Tyson 24 that federal courts deciding diversity
cases need only apply a state's statutory law, not its decisional law, in
obeying the command of the Judiciary Act. For almost a century
thereafter federal courts steadily erected a body of general law
16. 435 F.2d at 527-28.
17. 402 U.S. 932 (1971).

18. 435 F.2d at 527-28.
19. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
20. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
21. See text accompanying notes 34-44 infra.
22. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1-35, 1 Stat. 73-93, now codified in title 28, United
States Code (1964).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964) (corresponds to Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat.

92).
24. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I(1842).
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superimposed on and often at variance with state opinions on
questions of common law.25 The existence of two bodies of applicable
law led to forum shopping and unequal administration of the law in
favor of diversity plaintiffs. 2 1 When confronted once again with
conflicting federal and state decisional law in the case of Erie
Railroad Co. v.. Tompkins, 2 the Supreme Court, per Justice
Brandeis. announced that the phrase "the laws of the . . . states" in
the Judiciary Act had been erroneously limited to state statutory law,
and henceforth would include state decisional law in substantive
matters. 2. It further declared that the course pursued by federal courts
during the preceding century in creating a body of federal common
law was unsupported by any grant of power from the Constitution., 9
Three concurring justices objected to the latter holding, expressing
doubt that lack of constitutionality could be conclusively shown,"
and asserted that the new. statutory interpretation alone was a
sufficient* ground for the decision. 3 ' These concurring opinions
immediately touched off the debate over the 6xtent to which the Erie
ruling was. constitutionally compelled, which debate continues
32
unresolved to this day.
The Erie decision also marked the beginning of efforts to find the
line between procedural and substantive law, since Erie applied only
25. See Sharp & Brennan, The Application of the Doctrineo] Swift v. Tyson Since 1900, 4
IND. L.J. 367 (1929).

26. See, e.g., Interstate Realty & Investment Co. v. Bibb Co., 293 F. 721 (5th Cir. 1923);
Harrison v, Foley, 206 F. 57 (8th Cir. 1913); Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 150 U.S. 349
(1893); Mills. Should FederalCourts Ignore .ate Laws?. 34 AM.L. REV. 51 (1900).
27. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28. Id.at 78.
29. Id.at 80.
30. Id. at 90-92.

31. Id.at 80-84. 90-92.
32. in support of the Erie majority's view of constitutionality see, for example. Bowman,
The Unconstitutionality of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson, 18 B.U.L. REv. 659 (1938); Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law.39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383.384-98 (1964):
Hill. The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution. 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541 (1958); Smith, Blue
Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism inDiversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REV.

443. 465-70 (1962). For the view that Erie was not required by the Constitution see, for example:
Ahrens. Erie v. Tompkins-The Not So Common Law. I WASHBURN L.J. 343 (1961); Clark,
State Law inthe Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins. 55 YAL
L.J. 267. 278 (1946); Cowan. Constitutional Aspects of the Abolition oJ Federal "Common
Law." I LA. L, REv. 161 (1938); Keeffe, In Praiseof Joseph Story. Swift v. Tyson and "The"
True National Common Law: 18 AM. U.L. REv. 316 (1969). The arguments are summarized
in C. WRIGHT, LAW op FEDERAL CouRTs 228-32 (3d ed. 1970). In its simplest form the question
is'whether the Erie holding is constitutionally compelled, or merely constitutionally permitted.
That it is constitutionally proscribed has not been seriously advanced.

Vol. 1971:7851

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

to state substantive law.3 A significant early gloss on the Erie ruling

34
required federal courts to apply state conflicts of laws rules,

establishing the rule that was partially responsible for Doiald Atkins'
difficulties. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York5 came an attempt to
formulate an alternative rule to the eluhive substance-procedure
dichotomy.36 The resulting "outcome-determinative" test required a
federal court hearing a diversity case to apply the forum state's statute
of limitations, where failure to do so would "significantly affect the
result of a litigation . . . -37 Because the use of the terms
"substance" and "procedure" has persisted, the net result of

Guarantyhas simply been for statutes of limitations to be categorized
as matters of substantive law for Erie purposes. In a similar vein, it
was held in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.," that for
the purpose of tolling a statute of limitations state law is sufficiently
"substantive" to prevail over federal law where the Federal Rules and

state procedural law differ as to the point at which an action is deemed
to commence. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,

Inc.3 9 the court injected a new variable into the Erieequation, namely

that of "countervailing federal considerations." Byrd held that in

procedural matters federal courts could set aside the outcomedeterminative test if this was required by the presence of significant

factors favoring the effective functioning of the federal judiciary. 4 In
particular, the case upheld the right in federal diversity cases to a jury
determination of issues otherwise exclusively triable by a judge under

state law. Hanna v. Plummer," the most recent principal case in the
33. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
34. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (194 1).
35. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
36. Speaking for the majority in Guaranty, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are much talked about in the
books as though they defined a great divide putting across the whole domain of law. But,
of course, "substance" and "procedure" are the same key-words to very different
problems. Neither "substance" nor "procedure" represent the same invariants. Each
implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.

326 U.S. at 108.
Illustrative of Justice Frankfurter's point is the classification of statutes of limitations as
"procedural" for the purpose of choosing between forum and foreign law in state conflicts of
law situations, and as "substantive" for the purpose of choosing between state and federal law
in state-federal conflicts of law situations.
37. 326 U.S. at 10.
38. 337 U.S. 530, 531-34 (1949).
39. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
40. Id. at 537-38.
41. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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development of the Erie doctrine, also relied on countervailing federal
considerations in order to sustain a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
over a contrary state statute, thus effectively overruling Ragan to the
extent that it may have held to the contrary4" and assuring the preeminence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over conflicting
state procedures.4 3 In its modern form then, the Erie doctrine
continues to require observance of state law in substantive matters;
may bring certain matters into the penumbra of substance if they are
outcome determinative; and may reserve certain outcomedeterminative issues for federal determination where there are strong
federal considerations.
The Effect of Atkins on the Erie Doctrine
The court in Atkins declares that "we do no violence to the
doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," in deciding that the
tolling effect of pendency in diversity cases is a matter for federal
determination.44 In at least two respects, however, Atkins represents a
departure from prior Erie rulings. First, Atkins is a departure from
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. Guaranty implied that any normally
procedural issue which would be outcome determinative was to be
treated in effect as an issue of substantive law.15 That this outcomedeterminative test is valid today, and has only been modified rather
than abolished by the countervailing federal considerations rule, is
recognized by the Atkins court." And, although the reservation of
statutes of limitations for state determination in Guaranty did not
specifically include tolling provisions, the Court's holding in Ragan
clearly indicates that tolling provisions are to be treated no differently
than statutes of limitations. 47 To this extent, at least, Ragan is
apparently still good law."8 Atkins, on the other hand, marks the first
42. The court in Hanna explicitly refused to overrule Ragan, 380 U.S. at 469-70, and the
question of Ragan's continuing vitality has engendered some comment. See, e.g.. C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1057 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER]; Note, Federal Rule 3 and the Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Diversity
Cases, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1281 (1968). See also note 48 infra and accompanying text.
43. 380 U.S. at 473-74.
44. 435 F.2d at 535.
45. 326 U.S. at 110-12. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
46. 435 F.2d at 536.
47. 337 U.S. at 532. See also Glebus v. Fillmore, 104 F. Supp. 902. 903 (D. Conn. 1952)
(dictum), and cases cited therein.
48. The Hanna court, in distinguishing Ragan. said that the holding in the latter case "was
not that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but
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time that tolling has been treated as independent of the underlying
state limitations statute, either before or since Erie.4 9 Second, to the
extent that the court in Atkins seeks to justify its separation of the two
on grounds of a countervailing federal interest in maintaining the
unitary nature of its court system, it represents a departure from Byrd
and Hanna as well. The exceptions to Guaranty's outcomedeterminative test which were formulated in Byrd and Hanna were
based strictly on specific expressions of countervailing federal
interests. While the courts have differed on the weight to be given to
the federal interest in maintaining the unitary nature of its court
system, 50 the presence or absence of a specific embodiment of that

interest in a federal statute or rule would appear, by weight of
authority, to be decisive to the determination. 5' Atkins, on the other
hand, represents an attempt to find countervailing considerations in

general federal policies unsupported by or, at best, with only
analogical support from specific legislation. 52 It is noteworthy that the

arguments cited in support of this holding in A tkins- are remarkably
similar to those advanced over one hundred years ago in Swift v.
rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and
therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the
enforcement of state law." 380 U.S. at 470. Hanna, on the other hand, involved'a direct clash
between the federal rules and state law. The Erie doctrine, the Hanna court said, did not apply in
adjudicating the validity of federal rules. Id. Thus, Ragan and Hanna were thought to be
compatible. But see FederalRule 3 and the Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Diversity
Cases, supra note 42, at 1285-87.
49. See. e.g.. Note, FederalStatutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
68, 72 (1953). But cf. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965) (plaintiff's
prior state court action tolled a federal limitation provision, and thus his federal court action
was timely).
50. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 244.
51. See, e.g.. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1963),
overruling Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), to the extent that
Jaftex asserted a "federal standard" for determining jurisdiction over foreign corporations in
ordinary diversity cases, on the ground that the assertion "was unwarranted, was causing
confusion by its failure to identify or define the 'federal standard,' and was leading to
unfortunate results in the district courts." 320 F.2d at 225.
The Jaftex case bears a striking resemblance to Atkins. In Jaftex the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the dismissal of a complaint against a foreign corporation, holding that
state law supported the assertion ofjurisdiction, but going on to assert as an alternative basis for
its reversal, that the matter was governed by a "federal standard," which the court found to be
implied in a host of federal statutes and decisions none of which, however, were directly on point.
Judge Friendly, who wrote for the majority in Arrowsmith, concurred in the result in Jaftex on
the ground that state law supported the assertion of jurisdiction, but criticized the alternative,
federal ground for the decision as unwarranted.
52. See notes 80-92 infra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 98-99 infra and accompanying text.
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Tyson,54 the cornerstone of pre-Erie federal common law. In order to
determine whether or not these departures have indeed done no
violence to the Erie doctrine, each must be examined in greater detail.
The modern Erie doctrine still attempts to limit federal diversity
law to those matters which may be classed as procedural. Rules which
govern the tolling of state statutesof limitations may to the uninitiated
be obviously procedural, but in the context of Guaranty and Ragan,
which still represent good Erie law, it is far from obvious." Statuteof-limitations questions in diversity litigation are reserved for
determination by state law, not only because generally the only
limitations law available is state law, 6 but because, as Guaranty
shows, resolution of such questions is usually a significant
determinant of the litigation's outcome.57 Logically, however, a rule
for tolling a statute of limitations is precisely as outcome
determinative as the statute of limitations itself. Conversely, if it is
maintained that a federal tolling rule is necessary in the interest of
maintaining the unitary nature of the federal judiciary, it would
appear, as Judge Winters points out in his special concurrence in
Atkins, that a federal statute of limitations is equally necessary
therefor, "so that by implication Guaranty Trust is being
overruled. 58 Byrd and Hanna fashioned exceptions to Guaranty, but
left the substance of its outcome-determinative test, at least as applied
to statutes of limitations, intact. Thus, the creation in Atkins of a
judge-made federal rule to toll state statutes of limitations in the case
of succeeding identical diversity suits brought in different federal
courts, not only strikes at the heart of Guaranty, but to that extent
marks a departure from Byrd and Hanna as well.
In justifying the distinction which it has drawn between tolling
rules and the underlying limitations statute, the court in Atkins relied
on the maintenance of unity in the federal court system as the
countervailing consideration to authorize departure from the
outcome-determinative test. 5 This is clearly broader than the
exception as originally fashioned. In Hanna the compelling federal
interest was clearly embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See notes 95-97 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
435 F.2d at 538 nA8.
See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
435 F.2d at 539.
Id. at 531. 535. 537.
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Procedure;"0 in Byrd the federal policies were expressed in the seventh
amendment jury trial guarantee.6 But in Atkins there is no such
limiting factor. Theoretically, any issue occurring in diversity
litigation which is currently determined by resort to state law could be
made the object of rulemaking by federal judges because of alleged
adverse effects on the unitary nature of the federal judiciary.6 2 Absent
the support of a specific statute or constitutional provision, the
judicial declaration of the unitary nature of the federal court system
as a countervailing federal consideration for purposes of the Erie
doctrine6" represents an extension of Hanna and Byrd.
Of course, the Court does more than recite the words "unitary
nature of the federal court system" in seeking to establish a
countervailing federal interest. It emphasizes the inappropriateness of
referring to state law in a federal diversity suit in order to gauge the
effect of the pendency of an identical suit in another federal court. 4 It
also attempts to draw support from the fact that "in the analogous
situation of transfers from one district court to another, after a period
of limitations has run, we look to federal law to reach the conclusion
that the pendency of the action in the transferor district tolls the
running of the statute." 5
It is clear that there are drastic differences between the Virginia
and federal court systems. The majority in Atkins apparently believed
that state institutional considerations shaped the state's tolling
provision and that these considerations are irrelevant to, and
incompatible with, the federal judicial system.66 In its opinion the
majority conducted a review of the Virginia court system to point out
the elements which it believed most likely to produce rules inimical to
the federal system. The opinion listed the autonomous nature of
Virginia's trial courts; 67 the sparse procedural provisions for'
coordination of effort or complementing of functions within the
system;68 and the sometimes overlapping territorial and subject matter
60. 380 U.S. at 473-74.
61. 356 U.S. at 537-40.
62. Perhaps the earliest objects of such a process would be statutes of limitations and
conflicts of law rules, since, as this case illustrates, they can occasionally be troublesome in
diversity litigation.
63. 435 F.2d at 537.
64. Id. at 531, 534.
65. Id. at 528.
66. Id. at 534.
67. Id. at 531-32.
68. Id. at 532-33.
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*jurisdiction of the various types of trial courts. 9 The state tolling law
which allegedly springs from these institutional features suspends the
statute of limitations by reason of the pendency of a former suit in
only four instances, none of which properly applied to Atkins'
action. 70 In Jones v. Morris Plan Bank of Portsmouth,7 the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals strictly construed the tolling law to allow
the statute of limitations to run while plaintiff filed the same cause of
action successively in two different state courts.
More recently, however, in the case of Weinstein v. Glens Falls
Insurance Co.,72 an.equity suit ancillary to a pending law action was
treated as a continuation of the law action and not barred by the
statute. And in Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 73 Virginia's highest
court declared its reluctance to reach results which are unjust and
inequitable in deciding statute-of-limitations questions. Moreover, the
Atkins court's claim that institutional features in the state court
system are responsible for the strict standards of Virginia's tolling
statute or the holding in Jones v. Morris Plan Bank is not
substantiated. The fact that a substantial majority of states, many
with court systems exhibiting features similar to Virginia's, have
tolling laws which would have permitted Atkins to proceed in this
instance to the merits of his suit, 74 is some indication that state
policies other than institutional considerations may be involved.
69. Id.

70. An analysis of our statute (section 5826) shows that in only four instances is there a
suspension of the statute of limitations by reason of the pendency of a former suit
brought in due time. These are: (1)Where such suit abates "by return of no

inhabitant," that is, where the writ is not served for that reason; (2) where the suit
abates by reason of the "death of marriage" of a partyz (3) where, after the plaintiff has

obtained a judgment or decree in his favor, it is "arrested or reversed upon a ground
which does not preclude a new action or suit for the same cause". and (4) where "there be

occasion to bring a new action or suit by reason of the loss or destruction of any of the
papers or records in a former suit or action which was in due time." None of these
provisions applies to the plaintiffs case. There is no saving provision where a suit, such as

that of the plaintiff here, was brought in the wrong forum or was dismissed otherwise
than upon the merits. Jones v. Morris Plan Bank of Portsmouth, 170 Va. 88, 92-93, 195

S.E. 525, 526 (1938), as quoted in 435 F.2d at 529 n.14.
71. 170 Va. 88, 195 S.E. 525 (1938).
72. 202 Va. 722, 119 S.E.2d 497 (1961).
73. 210 Va. 1i,168 S.E.2d 257 (1969).
74. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 355 (West 1954); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24
(1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 32 (1968); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5856
(1968); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 205 (McKinney 1963); Ouio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19
(Page 1954); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (1958). But cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.06
(1960); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:14-28 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 33 (1953).
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It may indeed be true, as the majority points out, that by its nature
the issue before it in Atkins "never has been and never will be
resolved, or even considered, by any court in the Commonwealth of
Virginia," 5 but this is a frequently occurring situation in diversity
litigation, in which the federal judge in effect sits as another state
court; and federal judges have been remarkably versatile in applying
state laws to novel situations. This versatility, however, was lacking in
the Atkins decision.
It would appear that the court created the federal tolling rule
mainly to help plaintiff escape the pernicious procedural trap sprung
by the courts in Kentucky.76 Inexplicably, however, the court chose
not to employ an equally effective and less questionable rationale, i.e.,
to adopt an interpretation of Virginia law permitting the statute of
limitations to be tolled, to achieve the same end. Indeed, while the
majority's resort to the "countervailing federal considerations"
exception intimates that to apply state law would be to subvert a
legitimate federal interest, the majority opinion in fact fairly bristles
with admissions that by judicious application of state law, the same
result could have been achieved without the creation of a "federal
rule." 77 The special concurrence of Judges Winter and Sobeloff was
specifically so grounded. 78 To them, plaintiff's Virginia suit was
merely a continuation of his earlier action in Kentucky, and was
therefore to be disposed of in his favor by virtue of the decision in
Weinstein, which could be accepted, they argued, as the latest
expression of Virginia law. 79 It was unnecessary to decide more than
that Atkins' suit was not barred by Virginia limitations law. In the
view of these two judges, the formulation of a federal tolling rule was
therefore unjustified.
In the face of the adequacy of state law to achieve an equitable
result, therefore, the only real justification for the formulation of such
a rule is that, quite apart from the applicable state law, the rule serves
to promote a policy of unity within the federal system. The court
professed to find strong support for its position by citing an apparent
analogy between the initiation of plaintiff's action in Virginia and a
75. 435 F.2d at 531.
76. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g.. 435 F.2d at 529, 530, 531, 534-35.

78. Id. at 538-59.
79. Id. at 538-39.
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hypothetical transfer of his case under the federal transfer provisions'"
from the Kentucky federal court to the federal court in Virginia." For

reasons not made known to the court, the case was not transferred;
however, the court speculated that if it had been validly shifted to the
Virginia court, the filing in Kentucky would have tolled the Virginia

statute of limitations.82 In testing the accuracy of the analogy drawn
by the court, a perplexing question of Atkins' transferability is

presented. If Atkins had first filed in Kentucky after the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held that Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations
applied in cases arising in foreign jurisdictions with a longer statute of
limitations83 and after Kentucky's one-year statute had run, his suit
would probably not have been transferable." A fortiori a filing in a
district where the statute had run would not toll the statute in any
other district.85 Since the dismissal of Atkins' suit in Kentucky in
80. References to "federal transfer provisions" are to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) & 1406(a)
(1964):
§ 1404(a). For the convenience of the parties and witnesses. in the interest of justice.
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.
§ 1406(a). The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district
or division in which it could have been brought.
8I. 435 F.2d at 537-38.
82. Id.
83. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
84. The legislative history of § 1406(a) as amended in 1949 reveals that it was enacted to
prevent plaintiffs from bringing suit in the wrong district merely to obtain service of process on
the defendant, and then have the case transferred to a proper district. See Skilling v. Funk
Aircraft Co., 173 F. Supp. 939, 942 (W.D. Mo. 1959); I J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.14614] at 1906 (1964). Bringing suit in a district where the statute of limitations has run in
order to toll the statute of limitations in the district to which plaintiff desires a transfer appears
to be a similar abuse. Under present practice, dismissal under § 1406(a) is usually reserved for
actions evidencing harassment or some other indication of plaintiff's bad faith. I J. MOORE.
FEDERAL PRACTICE , 0. 146[5] at 1909. The key issue here is whether the federal district court in
Virginia was a court where the action "could have been brought." Since Virginia's long-arm
statute was not enacted until 1964, defendant would not have been amenable to process from the
transferee court before Virginia's statute of limitations expired. To grant transfer under the
theory that the transferee forum need not originally have been one where the case might have
been brought. Schultz v. McAfee, 160 F. Supp. 210 (D. Me. 1958). would seem hardly to be in
the interest of justice where defendant is concerned. Normally the defendant must be amenable
to process in the transferee forum before institution of the suit, Sypert v. Bendix Aviation Corp.,
172 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. III. 1958). The precise transferability question presented by Alkins has
nIever been decided. Judge Craven, dissenting in the court's initial affirmation of dismissal,
presents a detailed case for transferability concluding, however. "that the path to trial on the
merits [by means of transfer] is not a broad, inviting one." and suggesting only that "it may
have been negotiable." 401 F.2d at 739.
85. Filing tolls all applicable statutes of limitations, Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467
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effect was a declaration that the applicable statute of limitations had
run before he had filed,8" it cannot be said with certainty that the filing
in Kentucky would have tolled the Virginia statute, or even that the
Kentucky court could have transferred the suit at all. This may
explain why transfer was not sought. Another possible explanation is
that the Virginia federal court was not a court where the suit could
have originally been brought until enactment of the long-arm statute
in 1964.81 If Virginia was not a potential transferee forum, its statute
of limitations would not have been tolled by the action in Kentucky
and would have run before the long-arm statute 'made the Virginia
federal court a possible transferee forum. 8 A third explanation for the
failure of plaintiff to formally transfer is the possible belief that the
law of the transferor forum carried over to the transferee forum.8"
Under this rule, a transferring court in Kentucky would have
"transferred," and the transferee court would have applied
Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations, which in Atkins' case had
already run. Transfer law is at best, however, a somewhat uncertain
area of the law, permeated by conflicts between different
jurisdictions.90 Analogy to transfer provisions offers little support to
the tolling rule where it is not clear that the instant case was even
transferrable.
Despite the doubtful transferability of his cause of action, Atkins'
now has successfully achieved his change of venue, albeit in an
unorthodox manner. The one remaining question is what this
portends for existing federal transfer provisions. If any plaintiff may,
while his first cause of action is pending, re-file the same action in
another jurisdiction which he thinks will be more advantageous to
(1962). Districts not eligible as transferee forums would not have applicable statutes of
limitations.
86. See Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762, 763 (1967); note 9 supra and
accompanying text.
87. See note 84.
88. Id.
89. This area of the law is still unsettled. The proposition cited in the text was the holding of
the leading case of Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), but that rationale applied only
to transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964). But cf. Geehan v. Monahan, 382 F.2d 111 (7th Cir.
1967). The recent case of Carson v. U-Haul Co.. 434 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1970), restricted the Van
Dusen holding to transfers by defendants. Carson was decided three days before Atkins. See
generally Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws. 22 U. CHt. L. REv. 405 (1955);
Currie, The Erie Doctrineand Transfer of Civil Actions, 17 F.R.D. 353 (1955). The conclusions
reached by Professor Currie in these articles were withdrawn five years later in Currie, Change
of Venue and Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (1960).
90. See generally I J. MOORE, supra note 84, at 0.145 et seq.
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him, thereby gaining the tolling benefit of formal transfer and
avoiding possible fatal dismissal by the judge in the first forum, of
what value are the transfer provision to plaintiffs? Obviously, some
forum shopping is possible under current transfer laws, 9' but forumshopping plaintiffs have normally been subject to some discretionary
restraint from the magistrate, who may dismiss rather than transfer,
when justice requires.12 Under .the rule announced in Atkins, no such
restraint on blatant forum shopping is provided, and change of venue
is conceivably available to a plaintiff who would be denied a formal
transfer. Thus the new tolling rule goes considerably beyond the
statutes it allegedly imitates, and indeed seems to undercut, rather
than promote, that statutory expression of federal policy.
In summary, while the majority opinion adequately establishes the
fact that the federal judiciary is a remarkably unified system, and that
preserving this unity is highly desirable, it fails to show how the
presence or absence of a federal tolling rule affects that unity. The
federal court system exhibits a unitary nature because it was framed
by a series of federal enactments based on constitutional mandate.
Unity is maintained by a set of procedural rules applicable to all
federal courts. There is no suggestion in the court's opinion that any
of these elements was threatened by the application of the Virginia
tolling rule. As a practical matter, the ostensible injustice threatening
Donald Atkins was in no way attributable to any flaw in the rules of
decision regarding Virginia's statute of limitations, nor did the real
solution to his problem lie in any modification of the federal judicial
system. His difficulties stemmed first from counsel's willingness to
play the statute of limitations game down to the wire 9 3 and then from
some untenable rule of jurisprudence which induced the federal courts
sitting in Kentucky to judicially turn their heads when that state's
borrowing statute was amended in 1942, because the highest state
court did not have occasion to officially declare it the law until 1965.11
Here then, the unity of the federal judicial system is invoked to correct
with a tolling rule the results of unrelated institutional flaws.
91. Forum shopping problems under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) are not at stake according to
Judge Craven in Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co.. 401 F.2d 731,739 (1968). See also Note, Federal
Courts-The "'Erie Doctrine" and Tolling of the State Statute of Limitations. 47 N.C.L. Rv.
715 (1969).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1964).
93. Atkins' original action was filed only two days before Virginia's statute of limitations
would have run and almost a full year after Kentucky's had expired.
94. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
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Indeed, it may be only slightly hyperbolic to contend that this
particular rationale has extended Erie so far that it begins to look
again like Swift v. Tyson.9" Following the Swift decision, federal
courts sitting in diversity cases were permitted to ignore state court
decisions on common-law matters and supplant them with a
presumably more,-adequate rule of federal law.9" It was hoped thereby
to standardize key areas of the law and eliminate the uncertainty and
occasional unfairness which resulted from reliance on state law in
diversity cases.97 While it is probably inaccurate to dub Atkins a
return to Swift, each opinion contains language which ascribes its
holding-allowing federal rulings to supersede state decisions-to
a desire to standardize the law and relieve diversity litigants of disabilities created by different states' laws.98 The new tolling rule is
not substantially different from the myriad rules of federal common
law which sprang up after Swift,9" either in form or rationale.
Thus, Atkins not only extends the letter of Erie through a broader
concept of countervailing federal considerations, but appears also
to turn the spirit of Erie back in the direction of Swift.
Atkins

AS AN EXERCISE IN JUDICIAL RULEMAKING

Quite apart from its effect on the Erie doctrine, the Atkins
decision is unusual for its forthright assertion of judicial rulemaking
power. Although it is widely recognized today that a great deal of
judge-made law-both procedural and substantive--exists, °0 lower
federal courts are nevertheless on uncertain ground when exercising
their rulemaking power. The power to regulate practice and procedure
was possessed by the earliest common-law and equity courts in
95. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
96. See Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation. 69 HARV. L. REV.
66, 70 (1955).
97. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19.

98. Justice Story declared for the majority in Swift: "Undoubtedly, the decisions of the
local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention

of this court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own
judgments are to be bound up and governed." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19. Compare Judge
Haynsworth speaking for the majority in Atkins: "[S]ince the question here arises out of a
different system and reasonable answers are dependent upon the nature and structure of that
system and its effective functioning, we conclude that we must seek the answer as a matter of
federal, not state, law." 435 F.2d at 538.
99. See. e.g., Bowman, supra note 32, at 663.
100. See. e.g., Note, The FederalCommon Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969).
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England and in this country.'"' Some rules were merely decisional,'

others were formally declared by courts,

03

2

and an occasional act of

parliament attempted to ameliorate harsh technicalities of common-

law pleading. 04 Full scale legislative intervention in court rulemaking

occurred in England with the English Civil Procedure Act of 1833 and
the Hilary Rules of 1834.10- A similar trend began in the United States

with the 1848 Field Code of New York.'"6 Disenchantment with the
rigidity of legislative rules led to renewed interest in returning some

rulemaking power to the courts. 07 The issue in the United States was

and *remains, however, whether the legislature or the judiciary is

exclusively empowered to regulate judicial procedure, or whether the
power is shared or can be delegated by either or both. 08
With regard to federal courts, at least, the weight of authority is
said to support the right of Congress to prescribe rules of procedure
for the federal courts. 109 Frequent Congressional exercise of that right

culminated in the 1934 Enabling Act"10 delegating authority to the

Supreme Court to devise rules for federal court procedure subject to
Congressional approval,"' and the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure established pursuant thereto. In return, the Court is said to
101. See generally E. JENKS. A SHORT HISTORY OI ENGLISH LAW 191 (6th ed. 1949);
Morgan, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure. 2 MINN. L. Roy. 81 (1918) Rosenbaum,
Studies in English Civil Procedure. 63 U. PA. L. REV. 105, 151. 273. 380, 505 (1915). In this
country, the English rulemaking practice was adopted early in the proceedings of the new
Supreme Court, as witnessed by the following declaration: "The Attorney General having
moved for information, relative to the system of practice by which the altorney and counsellors
of this court shall regulate themselves, and of the place in which rules in causes here depending
shall be obtained, the CHIEF JUSTICE, at a subsequent day, stated, that -The court considers the
practice of the courts of King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the
practice of this court; and that they will, from time to time" make such alterations therein, as
circumstances may render necessary." In Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)414 (1792).
102. See E. JENKS, supra note 101, at 191.
103. See Rosenbaum, supra note 101. at 151. 165 n.50. For a list of English court rules of
the King's Bench from 1604 to 1827, and the Common Pleas courts from 1457 to 1822. see I
TIDD, PRACTICE Xxxvii-xlviii (9th ed. 1828).
104. See Morgan, supra note 101, at 81-82.
105. Id. at 82. See E. JENKS. supra note 101. at 192.
106. See Morgan, supra note 101, at 82.
107. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 32. at 257-58; Taft, Three Needed Steps oj
Progress. 8 A.B.A.J. 34, 35 (1922).
108. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1001 at 26.
109. Id. at 27. See note 1]2 infra.
110. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651. 48 Stat. 1064 (now codijiedin 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964)).
Ill. -'Tlhe Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe ...
practice and procedure in civil actions at law." Id. As required by the Enabling Act. the rules
were submitted for Congressional approval and became effective September 16. 1938.
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have "inferentially . . . recognized that a rule that is not within the
scope of the power delegated by Congress would be invalid."' 2 The

existing situation in federal courts may thus be described as "judicial
rulemaking pursuant to legislative delegation and subject to a

congressional veto."

3

A notable feature in the arrangement thus far

is the restraint that Congress has shown with respect to its veto
power."'
The uncertainty obtaining in federal rulemaking today stems from
the absence of an explicit definition of the extent to which an

individual court in the federal system may establish its own rules of
practice and procedure. Federal courts have always acquiesced in

legislative regulation of their practice and procedure, and it is now
settled that inferior trial or appellate courts may be required to adhere
to rules prescribed by the highest court." 5 If the rulemaking authority
delegated to the Supreme Court is complete and comprehensive, lower
federal courts are arguably without power to devise their own rules of
procedure beyond their authority to interpret the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to fit their own requirements and to establish

administrative rules." 6 Indeed, it could be said that this very lack of
power is a significant factor in the maintenance of the unitary nature

of the federal judiciary. To illustrate the role of lower federal courts in
procedural rulemaking, an analogy to their substantive rulemaking

power" 7 may be drawn. Since the Supreme Court admittedly has
112. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1001 at 29. See also Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,
326 U.S. 438 (1945).
The Enabling Act provides that the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). The Court has
scrupulously avoided construing the rules in derogation of that provision of the Act. The narrow
construction which the Court gave to the federal rules in Ragan, for example, could be said to be
due as much to a rear of overstepping its rulemaking authority as it was to the Court's desire to
adhere to its own judicially-created Erie doctrine. See notes 38, 42 supra and accompanying text.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has felt equally bound to uphold the power of Congress
to prescribe procedure and to delegate that power. In Hanna the Court immunized the federal
rules from attack on Erie grounds, reasoning that through the Enabling Act "the court has been
instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if.

.

. this Court

. .

. and

Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the
terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions." 380 U.S. at 471.
113. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1001 at 30.
114. Id. at 31.
115. See Note. The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts. 53 GEo. L.J.
1050 (1965); Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656

(1963).
116. See, e.g.. Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure,

49 HARV. L. REv. 1303, 1315 (1936).
117. See. e.g., The FederalCommon Law, supra note 100.
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neither the time nor the resources to produce all the substantive rules
that are needed in the federal system, 8 it must rely on lower courts to
formulate an appropriate rule when the need arises, which rule is then
subject to rejection or approval on review. Similarly, a lower federal
court might be required to decide which matters are properly within
its procedural rulemaking competence and which are better left to the
formal rulemaking machinery established for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure," ' guided in that determination by the policy of
restraint expressed in the Supreme Court's own deference to Congress
in rmatters of federal procedure.'12
Viewed in this light, the Atkins decision, far from promoting a
policy of unity in the federal judiciary, actually undermines that
policy in the very act of rulemaking to the extent that the rule so
formulated is not based on a specific statute or Federal Rule. And
while the Supreme Court's decision not to review Atkins permits the
lower court rule to become law, several possible ramifications of the
rule suggest that it might more properly have been subjected to the
scrutiny of those responsible for drafting and amending the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' 2 ' The most disturbing aspect of the
particular rule enunciated, as with the assertion of the rulemaking
power itself, is the rule's tendency to undermine explicit
manifestations of federal policy. That it could stimulate widespread
22
circumvention of the transfer statutes has already been indicated.
The dearth of details in the court-formulated rule leaves much
freedom for venue-changing plaintiffs. For instance, if mere filing of a
suit with no effort at pre-trial preparations obviously indicates
creation of pendency only to toll the statute, is that sufficient
pendency for purposes of the federal tolling rule? If the identical suit
filed in a second federal court has meanwhile acquired additional (or
fewer) parties or causes of action, is that "identical" for purposes of
the federal tolling rule? What if the theory of recovery has been altered
between suits? Is the running of the statute suspended indefinitely or
118. Id. at

1513, 1530-31.
119. In 1942 the Supreme Court designated the Advisory Committee which had prepared
the rules as a continuing Advisory Committee to consider amendments to the rules. See WRIGHT
& MILLER § 1006. While the Committee was discharged in 1956, Congress acting on a felt need
for a continuing body to propose amendments to the rules, amended the act creating the Judicial
Conference so as to include as one of its functions the task of advising the Supreme Court on
needed changes. See WRIGHT & MILLER § 1007.
120. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 119 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
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only for a limited time, and if only for a limited time, for how long?
To answer the foregoing questions and to correct possible abuses of
the rule, further rulemaking will be necessary, with further
opportunity for confusion and fragmentation in federal
practice- 23-perhaps leading to Congressional intervention-as the
inevitable consequence.
Of more immediate concern is that only in the Fourth Circuit will
the tolling rule be applied consistently,12 4 even though its very terms
presume and require its nationwide application. Clearly the transfer
rules would be of little use if only selected districts or circuits in the
federal system would accept a transferred case or ascribe a tolling
effect to the filing in the transferor forum. If, as the Atkins court
insists, the new tolling rule really is analogous to the transfer
provisions, it-like the transfer laws-can be of little service to
litigants unless it is by statute given the force of law throughout the
nation.
In short then, formulation of a federal tolling rule by the court in
Atkins is neither significantly less deleterious to nor significantly
more effective in furthering the unity of the federal judiciary than the
application of state law would have been. It is little wonder that the
two concurring members of the court, at least, urged the latter course
of action.'2
CONCLUSION

Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co. has given federal diversity
law a new rule to toll state statutes of limitations, but in so doing it
has added new features to the Erie doctrine. The countervailing
federal considerations concept has been broadened beyond explicit
constitutional and congressional mandates to include a federal policy
based on a "notion of an institutional interest in the uniform
management of the federal court system." Tolling rules have been
termed "procedural"-a departure from Guaranty-and made a
123. See note 51 supra, in which is described the experience of the Second Circuit with a
similar, judge-made rule.
124. Just as the Supreme Court's supervisory power extends only to lowerfederal courts, cf.
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 340 (1943), so the supervisory powers of a court of appeals extends only to those district

courts within its circuit, cf.Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 947 (5th Cir. 1966). See
generally The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, supra note 115; Note, The
Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts. 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
125. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
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thing apart from state statutes of limitations for the first time in
American judicial history. The decision has also taken as well as
given. From the transfer provisions it has taken an undetermined
amount of control over venue-changing in the federal court system.
From the entire federal judiciary itself it has taken a degree of
uniformity by declaring for one circuit a rule that actually requires
nationwide application. It has brought to an area of settled law, i.e.,
statutes of limitations in diversity cases, an issue which invites
continuing judicial innovation. In view of the numerous possible
undesirable consequences of Atkins, the high improbability that its
tortured fact situation will be repeated, and the general availability of
state law capable of settling issues presented here, the decision should
not be given wide application, nor should undue significance attach to
the Supreme Court's refusal to challenge the new rule.

